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Abstract
Context: Health care technological evolution through new drugs, implants and other interventions is a key driver of
healthcare spending. Policy makers are currently challenged to strengthen the evidence for and cost-effectiveness of
reimbursement decisions, while not reducing the capacity for real innovations. This article examines six cases of
reimbursement decision making at the national health insurance authority in Belgium, with outcomes that were contested
from an evidence-based perspective in scientific or public media.
Methods: In depth interviews with key stakeholders based on the adapted framework of Davies allowed us to identify the
relative impact of clinical and health economic evidence; experience, expertise & judgment; financial impact & resources;
values, ideology & political beliefs; habit & tradition; lobbyists & pressure groups; pragmatics & contingencies; media
attention; and adoption from other payers & countries.
Findings: Evidence was not the sole criterion on which reimbursement decisions were based. Across six equivocal cases
numerous other criteria were perceived to influence reimbursement policy. These included other considerations that
stakeholders deemed crucial in this area, such as taking into account the cost to the patient, and managing crisis scenarios.
However, negative impacts were also reported, in the form of bypassing regular procedures unnecessarily, dominance of an
opinion leader, using information selectively, and influential conflicts of interest.
Conclusions: ‘Evidence’ and ‘negotiation’ are both essential inputs of reimbursement policy. Yet, purposely selected
equivocal cases in Belgium provide a rich source to learn from and to improve the interaction between both. We formulated
policy recommendations to reconcile the impact of all factors identified. A more systematic approach to reimburse new care
may be one of many instruments to resolve the budgetary crisis in health care in other countries as well, by separating what
is truly innovative and value for money from additional ‘waste’.
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Introduction
Innovation of clinical practice has enabled professional care
providers to improve population health in a way that would have
been impossible before the 21th century. Yet, ironically, the same
drive for innovation and the related technology push from industry
is currently often cited as one of the main reasons why health
systems across Western countries are spinning out of control [1].
Spending levels are rising well above 10% of gross domestic
product, and in times of diminished economic growth the current
expenditure growth cannot be sustained [2]. Across-the-board cuts
are looming, with unpredictable consequences for the quality of
care.
There is a growing consensus that the rise in spending should be
topped off at the level justified by demographic changes and
inflation. This, however, might threaten the future capacity for
innovation. New drugs, implants and other care interventions
enter the market continuously. Nowadays policy makers are faced
with the increasingly difficult challenge to decide which new
entrants will be reimbursed and which will not. The general public
often presumes that this decision making process is done in a
systematic manner, guided by evidence of (cost) effectiveness.
Evidence based policy implies that policy makers make well
informed decisions about policies, programs and projects by
putting the best available evidence from research at the heart of
policy development and implementation [3]. In our context,
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evidence includes both clinical and economic knowledge from
research about (cost) effectiveness to support or negate the
appropriateness of reimbursement. This is further specified as (1)
therapeutic added value compared to existing therapeutic
alternatives in terms of mortality, morbidity and/or quality of
life, and (2) the ratio of cost to society per unit of therapeutic value.
Yet, reimbursement policy involves negotiation between payers
(state and/or insurers), care providers (professional interest groups)
and, sometimes, suppliers (pharmaceutical industry and manufac-
turers)[4].
According to the evidence based policy framework formulated
by Philip Davies, the decision to include or exclude an innovation
in/from reimbursement will, next to clinical and health economic
evidence, theoretically also depend on (1) Experience, expertise
and judgment of decision makers, (2) Financial impact – including
cost-effectiveness – and resources, (3) Values, ideology and
political beliefs, (4) Habit and tradition, (5) Lobbyists and pressure
groups, and (6) Pragmatics and contingencies [3]. In times of hypes
and trends in adopting care innovations [5], we add (7) Media
attention and (8) Adoption of innovation by other payers or
countries to this framework (see Figure 1). We elaborate further on
these concepts in Table 1.
In real life reimbursement policy, the relative weight of each of
these factors on the final outcome of decision making, and how
these factors interact, are both not clear [324]. The aim of this
study is to explore this complex interplay in a series of six case-
studies. The study focused on the following research questions: (1)
What was the relative impact of each of the framework factors on
the decisions made in six case-studies, as perceived by key
stakeholders? (2) How did such factors influence systematic
decision making, expected to be guided by evidence? And (3)
which pattern, if any, of differences and similarities of impact can
be identified across six case-studies?
Methods
Ethics statement
The study was approved by the University of Leuven ethical
review board, sub domain of public health. Written informed
consent was obtained from all participants.
Figure 1. Evidence based policy framework.* Legend: *Partially
adapted from Philip Davies (2004), [3].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078662.g001
Table 1. Concepts of the evidence based policy framework explained.*
Clinical and health economic evidence: Evidence helps the stakeholders make well informed decisions about reimbursement of new drugs, medical products and
care interventions by putting the best available knowledge from research at the heart of policy development and implementation. The stronger the evidence for
effectiveness, and thus potential gain in population health, the stronger the case for reimbursing an innovative diagnosis or treatment intervention.
Experience, expertise & judgment: Stakeholders bring a considerable degree of human and intellectual capital to the table, also known as tacit knowledge.
Judgment based on experience and expertise is especially critical for decisions where evidence is lacking or needs further nuanced interpretation due to limitations or
inconsistencies. The latter is often the case in reimbursement decision making. In real life policy making without the impact of experience, expertise & judgment is
impossible.
Financial impact & resources: In a world of limited (and declining) resources, a reimbursement decision also takes into account the cost to society by comparing
innovations and status quo based on cost per unit of health gain, within available budget limitations. Ideally this is done by cost-effectiveness, cost-benefit or cost-utility
analysis. In addition, the cost to the individual patient is also taken into account to safeguard financial accessibility as a determining factor of equity of care.
Values, ideology and political beliefs: Even when the effects or absence of effects of a new care intervention have been empirically demonstrated, values, ideology
and political beliefs remain a major driving force of policy making. As Philip Davies notes, the tension between both is at the centre of contemporary politics in open
democratic societies, also in terms of reimbursement decision making.
Habit & tradition: Reimbursement policies in each health system have a history of the way in which decisions are made, and factors taken into account when making
those decisions. Habits are often locked into and reinforced by formal and informal procedures. Aligning those parts of the system with new insights into how
reimbursement policies could rationally be improved represents a continuous challenge.
Lobbyists & pressure groups: Lobbyist and pressure groups seek to optimize interests and power relations external to what is best for the patient according to
evidence. The latter is therefore often used in a less systematic and selective way based on the (mis)match between evidence and interests.
Pragmatics & contingencies: An inherent constraint of the reimbursement decision making process are the short vs. long term time table, with evidence accruing
only slowly. In a context of unanticipated contingencies such as an epidemic outbreak or other public health crisis, policy often has to move forward at a speed that
does not allow the time to be thoroughly informed by evidence.
Media attention: The media are another potential influence on reimbursement decision making. Like lobbyists and pressure groups, the media often make use of
evidence in a less systematic and selective way. The media influence public opinion about what should and what should not be reimbursed. Both payers and care
providers might be sensitive to this.
Adoption by other payers or countries: Payers, being governments, health funds or insurers, do not decide on reimbursement in isolation. Decisions of
governments are expected to be influenced by what happens across country or state borders. Similarly, insurers take into account what is reimbursed or planned to be
reimbursed by their competitors. Care provider representatives will also look across borders to state their case.
*Partially adapted from Philip Davies (2004), [3].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078662.t001
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Stakeholders included key decision makers directly involved in
the decision to approve or decline reimbursement at a national
level in one or more of the six case-studies. The scope of our study
is restricted to the Belgian health system, wherein negotiation
occurs between federal government and sickness funds as payers,
and physician, and pharmacy representatives as care providers,
completed with academics. In Belgium, reimbursement decisions
for drugs and implants are guided by separate directives of the EU
that specify adoption requirements. Decision making takes place in
three national councils of the above representatives, as part of the
responsibility of the National Institute of Health and Disability
Insurance. One council makes reimbursement decisions about
medical drugs, another about medical devices such as implants,
and a third about medical fees for services unrelated to a specific
drug or device (such as breast cancer screening).
An overall set up of negotiation is considered to be typical for
part of the Western health systems, as illustrated in many health
system profiles, published by the Health Systems & Policies
Observatory of the World Health Organization [6].
The study made use of a series of six qualitative case-studies.
Cases, being national reimbursement decisions on new drugs,
implants or other care interventions that are known to be
contestable from a purely clinical and health economic evidence-
based perspective, were selected in the following way: First, both
media publications and scientific literature were screened to devise
a list of candidate cases, based on expressed doubt about the
evidence-based nature of reimbursement decisions made. Second-
ly, the research team selected six cases that covered drugs,
implants and other medical services in a balanced way. The case
studies address aortic endovascular replacement, breast cancer
screening, oseltamivir, hadron therapy, Alzheimer medication,
and trastuzumab. We emphasize that the selection of these cases
was not based on a fully-agreed upon lack of evidence; nor was it
the result of the subjective opinion of ourselves as investigators.
Literature revealed that in the selected cases inconsistencies of
study findings or discrepancies of normal procedures were likely at
play. Cases were focused upon to learn from, without judgment or
allocating blame.
Data were collected through in depth semi structured interviews
of eight key stakeholders, who were recruited based on their
involvement in cases and their central role in the decision making
process. At least two stakeholders were interviewed per case. In
Table 2 the stakeholders’ role in cases is presented. The interview
protocol was constructed according to the evidence based policy
framework as presented in Figure 1, with additional content
validity testing and piloting by three experts. The general
interview guide approach was used, providing both structure
and flexibility by adapting questions to the individual interview
process. It ensured that the same general areas of information were
collected from each participant, but still allowed a necessary
degree of freedom and adaptability. All data were collected by the
same interviewer who was trained beforehand by means of pre-
interview exercises and a pilot test. The purpose, format and
confidentiality were explained to each participant. Questions were
phrased in a neutral and mostly open-ended format. State-of-the-
art guidelines in qualitative data collection were followed [7-8].
The duration of the interviews varied from 48 minutes up to 1 h
15 minutes. Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed in full.
Participants had the opportunity to revise the transcript for further
clarification.
Thematic analysis was applied: First, themes were extracted
according to the categories of the evidence based policy
framework. Secondly, relevant text fragments were allocated to
themes. We also sought to cover additional themes, if present,
which were not addressed in the framework. Thematic analysis
was performed by HT, and independently validated by PVH and
DR. Disagreement was resolved through discussion until consen-
sus was reached.
Results
In this section we first describe the specific context of each case.
After separately reporting the results for six cases on the
stakeholder perceived impact of each factor, we cross our findings
across cases to describe relevant patterns. We use the following
codes to label cited text fragments according to stakeholder role:
CP = care provider/physician; G = government; and HF =
health fund/insurer.
The aortic endovascular replacement (EVAR) case
Context. In the year 2000, while evidence for this procedure
was still lacking, payers in Belgium decided to reimburse aortic
endovascular replacement, based on the presumption that this
would decrease the need for open surgery with its associated
potential complications. A reimbursement procedure meant to
temporarily support experimental testing of new techniques in a
limited number of hospitals, was extended to the majority of all
Belgian hospitals. However, in 2005 mounting evidence –
including the EVAR I and II RCT in the UK – showed that
the gain of less complications and mortality may be present during
1 to 2 years only, after which this benefit disappears [9210]. In the
EVAR II group with inoperable patients, there was no mortality
Table 2. The professional role of participating stakeholders in cases.
Aorta
endoprosthesis
Breast cancer
screening Oseltamivir
Hadron
therapy
Alzheimer
medication Trastuzumab
Respondent 1: Physician and politician X X
Respondent 2: Health fund X X X X
Respondent 3: Health fund X X
Respondent 4: Physician X
Respondent 5: Physician and expert X X
Respondent 6: Physician X
Respondent 7: Government X
Respondent 8: Government X
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0078662.t002
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benefit versus no intervention at all. In addition, many additional
complications, stent dislocation, leakages, and need for revisions
were the consequence of aorta endoprosthesis introduction, at a
rate of fivefold more complications. This resulted into an up to
20% reintervention rate and the need for lifelong surveillance.
Although at present long term cost-effectiveness is not clear, in
short term (up to four years) EVAR is more expensive than open
surgery, with a mean hospital cost difference per patient of 3311£
for low risk cases and 8649£ for high risk cases in UK trials,
presenting the strongest evidence [11212].
Clinical and health economic evidence. All three respon-
dents recognized that at the time of ‘experimental’ reimbursement
insufficient evidence was available. Respondent 3 (HF) sees this as
a typical example of a case in care for which evidence is expected
to develop later on, as an argument for this kind of temporary
reimbursement. In those days (year 2000) evidence was not sought
systematically (Resp. 3, HF, and 6, CP). The supplier firm hired
vascular surgeons and paid them to demonstrate the technique to
colleagues (Resp. 3, HF). This kind of ‘tutoring’ spread wildly
across a too high number of centers, with as a result some centers
placing only two or three stents a year (Resp. 6, CP). According to
resp. 6 (CP) some expert opinion leaders in vascular surgery
claimed that there was evidence, a statement that as such was
taken into account in the reimbursement decision. All three
respondents agreed that the growing use of this procedure in
practice, despite a lack of evidence, made it very difficult not to
reimburse. ‘Regulation was caught up by the facts’ as resp. 6 (CP)
noted. A lot of stents were already being placed.
Financial impact & resources. Cost-effectiveness was not
considered, only the additional cost of the new procedure as such:
higher prosthesis costs compensated by a lower length of stay (resp.
6, CP). Resp. 2 (HF) commented that the high cost of procedure,
making it almost financially unaffordable for patients to bear,
added to the pressure to reimburse. Resp. 6 (CP) agreed with this.
Resp. 3 (HF) added the following observation:
‘‘If a patient entered with an aneurysm, which can become a life
threatening condition, one did not check first whether he/she
could afford to pay for the procedure. A prosthesis was placed.
This was an important argument to grant reimbursement.’’
Habit & tradition. In this case the regular decision making
process was not followed: A shortcut was taken by allowing so
called temporary experimental reimbursement to spread via a
convention with hospitals. Respondent 6 (GP) confirms that such a
deviation is not exceptional, even today, whereas respondent 3
(HF) disagrees. In line with the external pressure, additional speed
lies often at the foundation of the decision to quicken the process.
Up to eight months could be gained in this way (resp. 3, HF).
Media attention. Before the decision making process even
started, a popular newsletter had published an article titled ‘I am
sitting here, waiting, with a bomb in my body’ (resp. 3, HF, and 6,
CP). It mentioned that the government refused to reimburse the
procedure. The article ended up the same day on the desk of the
minister of social affairs. Despite many question marks, this
hastened the process up to three weeks (resp. 3, HF). The minister
was also invited by the media to explain his position (resp. 6, CP).
Lobbyists & pressure groups. Resp. 3 (CP) confirms that
the implant industry pressured vascular surgeons to use the new
procedure. He/she adds that industry and the professional interest
group had found each other in this endeavor.
‘‘This was the way of the early days, when a technology reached
the market because professional interest groups were contacted by
the firms. They said: We have a good new device and we will take
you out for dinner, or to an international symposium, if you want
to try it out. In this way the device was introduced.’’
All three respondents agreed that external pressure was the
single most important determinant of the decision to grant
reimbursement. Pressure came from care providers, suppliers
and patients, the latter mainly due to the cost size for them to bear
without reimbursement.
The breast cancer screening case
Context. Mammography is used in both breast cancer
screening and in diagnostic case-finding. A screening mammog-
raphy is intended to detect a tumor in the pre-clinical stage. The
procedure needs to adhere to strict technical quality criteria and a
double reading by two trained radiologists. Diagnostic case-finding
on the other hand is intended to be applied if a patient has
complaints or if a care provider has detected an anomaly on
clinical examination. The quality of this last procedure is less
guaranteed than for a screening mammography. If a diagnostic
mammography is used as a first screening tool, the risk of detecting
false positives will increase [13]. This type of inappropriateness
increases the emotional burden of patients and cost to society in a
way that can be avoided to a larger degree with systematic
screening mammography use. Cost-effectiveness studies of screen-
ing mammography, assuming that mortality was reduced with
30%, predicted a 16000$ cost per year of life expectancy saved for
women aged 50 to 69 years [14215]. In Belgium since 2001 both
procedures are reimbursed, independently of their indication. A
large amount of inappropriate diagnostic screening has been
observed in Belgium, with significant geographical variability [16].
Clinical and health economic evidence. Evidence played a
crucial part in the decision to reimburse screening mammography.
Screening was promoted based on the evidence (resp. 1, CP/G).
Yet, respondent 4 (CP) adds that the evidence is currently the topic
of some heated debates, because Belgium does not reach a
sufficient screening coverage of the population to reach optimal
results. ‘‘If, after ten years, such conditions are not met, you lose a
large part of the evidence based potential.’’ (resp. 4, CP)
Experience, expertise & judgment. Both respondents (CP/
G) agreed that the initiative in this case mainly came from the
government and policy makers themselves. A broad input of
expertise has been taken into account (scientific associations,
universities, local communities, health funds) (resp. 1, CP/G).
Habit & tradition. The decision to organize screening
mammography at a population level and not only after referral
by a physician, implied a change from traditions and developing
new habits, although this met large resistance of some health care
professionals (resp. 1 CP/G). Resp. 1 also mentioned the habits of
the patient population as a restraining factor to organize screening
more systematically and efficiently: ‘As a patient you go to a
physician, you get what you want. You want to have a
mammography right away, because you are worried’. Patients
do not always follow the rules and regulations. Making patients
more responsible in this matter remains a challenge. Respondent 4
(CP) confirms that neither the care provider nor the patient are
motivated ‘‘to follow the correct way’’.
Adoption by other payers or countries. The fact that
neighboring countries already applied screening mammography
boosted public demand, which in turn incited policy makers to
take initiative (resp. 4, CP). Adoption by other countries was
interpreted by some decision makers as a proof of evidence (resp.
4, CP). The way in which screening was subsequently organized,
did however not correspond with the approach used in other
countries, such as the Netherlands and Scandinavia, where the
screening process was more steered by the state (resp. 1, CP/G,
resp. 4, CP).
Healthcare Reimbursement Decision Making
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Pragmatics & contingencies. Jurisdictions of regional ver-
sus federal government complicated and delayed matters. Preven-
tion is a jurisdiction of the regions in Belgium, whereas the
financing partly had to come from the federal level. Regional
responsibility is also perceived to be related to currently observed
geographical variability in the use of screening mammography
versus diagnostic screening (resp. 4, CP).
Lobbyists & pressure groups. According to resp. 1 (CP/G),
pressure from the medical corps and from radiologists in particular
resulted into a large degree of therapeutic freedom in the choice of
screening modalities.
Values, ideology & political beliefs. Resp. 1 (CP/G)
reported the influence of cultural differences between the north
and the south: the north acting in an Anglo-Saxon style by
supporting guidelines, the south focusing on therapeutic freedom
as is more the tradition in the south of Europe. In line with this,
resp. 4 mentioned the physician interpretation of the decision to
involve non-physicians in screening as an ideological choice. He
said this as follows: ‘‘Physicians thought this choice went towards a
form of state driven medicine, a medicine of the masses, without
personal contact with the physician’’. Both respondents make a
distinction between political preferences: socialist parties were
proponent of a more directed form of medicine, whereas liberal
parties were proponent of a more liberal (and freedom affirmative)
medicine.
The Oseltamivir case
Context. Oseltamivir is an antiviral drug promoted for both
therapeutic and profylactic use in influenza. The drug was
massively distributed and prescribed in Belgium during the
Mexican flu pandemic in 2009. The evidence for the effectiveness
of Oseltamivir is however sparse. The findings of the main
supportive study for its use, conducted by its pharmaceutical
supplier, have been heavily questioned in top ranking medical
journals. Whereas proponents argued that Oseltamivir prevented
infection in 80% of contacts [17], decreased mortality with 68 to
91% [18] (based on unpublished data) and decreased lower
respiratory tract complications with 55% [19], opponents only
accepted the evidence as sufficiently strong for a reduction of
duration of illness with about 1.5 day [20]. Belgian authorities
supported the use of Oseltamivir at a scale never seen before, and
hoarded up massive reserves.
Clinical and health economic evidence. Resp. 1 (CP/G),
resp. 2 (HF) and resp. 5 (CP) all agree that most decision makers
were aware of, and regretted, that clear cut evidence was lacking.
It was however difficult to question the purchasing decision,
because a primary opinion leader, as a scientist, confirmed the
need for providing Oseltamivir freely to high risk patients with
prescription and building up sufficient stock, although this point of
view was not shared by the scientific community as a whole. ‘‘If
evidence is lacking, as a politician you listen to the most renowned
expert’’ (resp. 1, CP/G).
Experience, expertise & judgment. Resp. 1 (CP/G)
wondered whether putting both the scientific and policy respon-
sibility in the hands of one person was not counterproductive. He/
she had preferred a clearer cut division of scientific versus policy
stakeholder ship, respecting checks and balances. ‘‘In this case
politicians hid behind the broad back of the scientific expert’’
(resp. 1).
Financial impact & resources. In the heat of emotions, the
financial impact was not taken into account (resp. 1, CP/G).
According to resp. 2 (HF), in terms of cost-effectiveness this as such
represented a disaster. Belgium spent more resources on the
purchase than other countries (resp. 5, CP).
Habit & tradition. Due to the urgent situation, the regular
scientific evaluation by an independent evidence-based drug
review was not performed, and instead replaced by the opinion
of a few experts (resp. 1, CP/G).
Media attention. The media increased the pressure of public
opinion, by instilling fear and reinforcing the – real or artificial –
urgency of decision making (resp. 1, CP/G).
Adoption by other payers or countries. Collaboration and
consensus building between countries did not work appropriately.
Each country implemented its own policy (Resp. 1, CP/G). In the
end, many countries stocked up Oseltamivir. Yet, Belgium did this
at the double rate of most other countries, to be completely
independent from others (resp. 5, CP).
Lobbyists & pressure groups. Public opinion, fearing a flu
pandemic, put a large pressure on politicians to do something,
even if the true effect was minimal (resp. 2, HF). Resp. 1 (CP/G)
mentioned the negative impact of the pharmaceutical industry,
that tried to sell products as much as possible, even when little
arguments were available.
The Hadron therapy case
Context. Hadron therapy uses protons and neutrons to
radiate tumors. Theoretically, this would lead to fewer side effects
than commonly used electron and foton-based radiotherapy,
especially for children. At present, these assumptions are however
not yet been confirmed by clinical trials. Two systematic reviews
concluded that no definitive conclusions can be drawn for head
and neck cancer, gastrointestinal tumors, non small-cell lung
cancer, sarcomas, cancer of the uterine cervix, prostate cancer,
most CNS tumors, and bladder cancer [21222]. The number of
current indications for the use of Hadron therapy is very limited,
with only some preliminary case studies on clinical benefit for rare
ocular melanomas and base of skull chordomas (51 patients per
year in Belgium). Despite scientifically founded independent
advice not to do so, a working group of all radiotherapy centers
in Belgian teaching hospitals have received green light to prepare
the building of a hadron center. If introduced, this will represent
an investment cost of 159 million euro, taking up a substantial
proportion of the planned budget to fight cancer [21222].
Clinical and health economic evidence. The respondents
(3, HF and 5, CP) indicate that this decision is being prepared with
ups and downs in the degree to which the evidence is taken into
account. At first, the evidence was put to the centre of the decision.
However, in a second term of legislation, with a new minister on
board, the evidence has moved to the background and the decision
is more ‘politicized’. Previous studies are ignored, and under the
pretence of doing a new study, reimbursement and implementa-
tion are being prepared.
Financial impact & resources. Despite knowledge of
lacking cost-effectiveness, the ministry pursues its plans (resp. 3,
HF and 5, CP). Positive financial impact of hadron therapy as a
regional investment strategy, for care providers and the local
population to benefit from, and for politicians, to defend local
voters, has surpassed patient value as one of the most determining
factors (resp. 3, HF and 5, CP).
Habit & tradition. Evaluation procedures were followed at
first. However, when politicians disagreed with the outcome,
regular procedures were being shortcut by an additional study
with external budgets controlled by the ministry itself, and not by
the normal stakeholder groups at government level (resp. 3, HF).
Resp. 3 (HF) also mentioned the habit in health care of wanting
to implement everything everywhere, because of the level of
prestige associated. Only the investment cost has prevented the
Healthcare Reimbursement Decision Making
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development of likely six to seven hadron centra across a small
country.
Adoption by other payers or countries. Larger countries
have a sufficient number of patients eligible for this type of care.
This is, however, not the case in Belgium (both resp.).
Lobbyists & pressure groups. Respondents mentioned that
radiotherapy centers of teaching hospitals, which represent both
the scientific expertise, and the potential gainer of a decision to
reimburse and implement, have no unbiased role in this case (resp.
3, HF). This is one of the reasons that this case is repeatedly put
onto the table, despite lacking evidence. In addition, local industry
acted as lobbyist to attract additional investments (resp. 5, CP).
Values, ideology & political beliefs. Politics dominated in
this case. One of the respondents referred to ‘‘an angry crowd of
politicians in power who disagree with scientific recommenda-
tions’’ (resp. 3, HF).
The Alzheimer medication case
Context. Dementia drugs, such as inhibitors of acetylcholin-
esterase (ChEIs) and memantine, are used to temporarily alleviate
the symptoms of the disease. Both types were reimbursed
according to severity of cognitive dysfunction in Belgium since
2002 and 2004, respectively. The clinical and health economic
evidence showed mixed results at that time. Due to small effect
sizes, the clinical relevance of positive findings was questionable
from the onset [23]. Afterwards the number of studies doubled and
about a dozen systematic reviews and meta-analyses were
published (see [24] for a recent example). Hulstaert and colleagues
concluded that dementia drugs improve cognitive functioning with
about 1 to 1.5 points on a scale of 30 [23]. Cost-effectiveness
studies departed from unrealistically larger effect sizes, and were
therefore not reliable. Reimbursement rules were revised in 2011,
making them more stringent (e.g. no memantine monotherapy).
Yet, the severity of cognitive dysfunction threshold was lowered,
making more patients eligible for reimbursement of dementia
drugs.
Clinical and health economic evidence. Respondents (2,
HF and 8, G) reported an evolution from little to a larger degree of
evidence-based policy in this case. About a decade ago, it was
possible to reimburse something for Alzheimer treatment, even
with unreliable evidence. The recent, more stringent reimburse-
ment policy takes evidence much more into account.
Experience, expertise & judgment. Whereas external
expertise, in terms of providing clinical and health economic
evidence, was almost irrelevant at the onset of reimbursement, this
factor dominated in recent reform (both resp.).
Financial impact & resources. Similarly, a lack of cost-
effectiveness, and very high prices demanded by the pharmaceu-
tical industry, were no objection to commence reimbursement
(resp. 2, HF). Later on, reimbursement adoptions were not based
on a complete cost effectiveness analysis, but moved in that
direction. In addition, in line with the evidence, an increase in
eligibility based on cognitive functioning, was compensated by a
demand to suppliers to decrease prices (resp. 8, G).
Media attention. This factor was very relevant a decade ago,
with impact on decision making (resp. 2, HF). At present,
complaints from patient organizations were taken up by the
media. This did not influence decision making (resp. 8, G).
Adoption by other payers or countries. Initially, this factor
was very relevant since Belgium was one of the last countries in
Europe to approve reimbursement of anti-Alzheimer drugs (resp.
2, HF). Recent reform was based on a more systematic review of
the evidence, in combination with an international policy analysis
(resp. 8, G).
Lobbyists & pressure groups. Public demand was high at
the time of introduction of anti-Alzheimer medication. This played
a large part in the reimbursement decision (resp. 2, HF). After
recent reform, some stakeholder groups complained about the
more stringent indication setting, backed up by pharmaceutical
suppliers. They also involved patient organizations in this matter.
Yet, after analysis no argument was found to modify reforms (resp.
8, G).
The Trastuzumab case
Context. Women in an early stage of HER2 positive breast
cancer (without metastasis), who receive chemotherapy after
surgery, live longer if they are treated with Trastuzumab. Two
to three year survival increased with 75 to 89%, [25]. This has
been confirmed by five clinical trials, of which the HERA study is
most known, [26]. See also the systematic review in Nature [27].
To treat 500 women in Belgium on a yearly basis, this would cost
5.17 million euro to society. Cost-effectiveness was confirmed for a
pre-chemotherapy regimen during 9 weeks, with resulting net
savings in long term [25]. Belgian government bypassed the
regular reimbursement decision making process to approve
reimbursement more rapidly.
Clinical and health economic evidence. Reimbursement
was arranged for, even before all evidence was critically reviewed
(resp. 2, HF and 7, G). Resp. 7 formulated this as follows: ‘‘If
evidence is defined from a purely scientific perspective, then it was
not yet present. If evidence is defined as women knocking at the
door who stated that their physician said this drug would help
them, which it also did, subjectively or not, then this other type of
evidence was available’’.
Financial impact & resources. First, the supplier intro-
duced the drug for a narrow group of patients with metastasized
breast cancer, with high prices. After the first approval of
reimbursement, the supplier broadened the group of eligible
patients to early breast cancer, but did not reduce prices, knowing
that public pressure would force decision makers to accept (resp. 2,
HF). This strategy is typical for pharmaceutical industries, he/she
adds. Making this new expensive drug affordable for all eligible
patients was also one of the main reasons why this reimbursement
was adopted rather quickly (resp. 7, G).
Habit & tradition. To speed up the process, normal
procedures were not followed. According to resp. 7 (G) this was
understandable to cope with public pressure. However, pharma-
ceutical industries build up such public pressure to commercialize
their products as quickly as possible.
Media attention. The media increased public pressure,
according to both respondents.
Adoption by other payers or countries. Examples of
reimbursement in other countries heightened public pressure
(resp. 7, G). He adds that this international policy analysis was
done in a rather selective way, by focusing on countries with
reimbursement, and ignoring countries without.
Pragmatics & contingencies. The fact that prescriptions
were increasing even before reimbursement was arranged for,
reinforced the decision (resp. 7, G).
Lobbyists & pressure groups. According to resp. 2 (HF)
and 7 (G), trastuzumab was considered to be a ‘wonder drug’. The
pressure of society, prescribers and suppliers was therefore
significant. Decision makers were swamped with expert opinions,
some independently, some sponsored by suppliers.
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Results across cases
Table 3 provides a schematic overview of the impact of each
framework factor across reimbursement cases. The impact of (1)
evidence was perceived as high in one case, and low in three
others. Interestingly, the anti-Alzheimer drug case showed that the
impact of evidence was perceived to increase over time, whereas
the opposite is true for the hadron therapy case. Experience,
expertise & judgment (2) shows a pattern of influence that differs
according to the impact of evidence. In low impact of evidence
cases, the opinion of one expert or one stakeholder group
dominated more. In high impact of evidence cases, input was
broader, and included external input by multiple experts.
In terms of financial impact & resources (3), with exception of
the first phase in the hadron therapy case and the second phase in
the Alzheimer drug case, cost to society was not perceived to have
a high impact in any case. Cost to the patient did have a high
impact in two cases, both in combination with a low impact of
evidence. Habit & tradition (4) was interpreted by respondents in
two ways: First, upholding reimbursement decision procedures or
not. In low impact of evidence cases, procedures were not followed
or shortcuts were taken. Secondly, as inducing a change in
healthcare traditions as a consequence of a reimbursement
decision. The breast cancer screening case showed that healthcare
system habits can be changed, according to respondents. Yet,
existing habits did temper the extent to which change could be
fully leveraged.
Media attention (5) was perceived to have a high impact in four
cases, each time combined with a low impact of evidence. The
impact of adoption by other payers or countries (6) was in all cases
considered to be medium to high. This was used as a source of
information to examine the evidence basis and, in the Alzheimer
medication case, to decide to implement. In some cases with low
impact of evidence, comparisons were made selectively or
independently of contextual differences, to pursue the objective
that one or more stakeholder groups aimed at.
Pragmatics & contingencies (7) were reported to have a high
impact in three forms: decision making in a public crisis situation,
deciding after the care intervention was already widely spread
across the market, and having to take into account jurisdictions in
decision making of multiple payers, states or regions. The impact
of lobbyists & pressure groups (8) was high in all cases, except in
the second phase of the Alzheimer medication case. In two cases
clear conflicts of interest were reported to impact upon the
decision. More specifically, care providers, as co-decision makers,
were financial benefiters of a positive reimbursement decision,
while they served as scientific experts to objectively examine and
report the evidence in a balanced way. Finally, values, ideology &
political beliefs (9) had a high perceived impact in two cases, in
which both political and cultural differences directed decision
making.
Discussion
To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first studies to
analyze in depth which factors were at the basis of reimbursement
decisions, for which the evidence was lacking or debatable. Our
findings confirm, in line with other publications, that evidence is
not the sole criterion on which reimbursement decisions are based
[324]. The results corroborate the assumptions of the evidence
based framework formulated by Philip Davies [3]. All nine factors
played a part across the six cases we examined. By extensively
interviewing a number of key decision makers in each case, in an
atmosphere of trust and anonymity, we were able to lift part of the
veil of secrecy that often obscures health policy decision making
[28].
We agree with Philip Davies that it is impossible to judge in
hindsight whether a good or bad decision has been taken [3]. Our
findings illustrate the complexity of health care policy. In a
democratic society, where multiple stakeholder groups negotiate to
reach a ‘relatively best’ decision, factors such as politics and media
attention each have their own legitimate place. To state that only
evidence and cost-effectiveness should guide reimbursement
decisions, runs the risk of introducing a technocratic approach
blind to the multiple concerns and trade-offs of current society.
However, the results provide policy makers with conclusions
that could guide future reform in reimbursement decision making.
Health care across developed countries is in dire need of system
improvements that safeguard what works well for the patient– the
legitimate impact of many factors we described – and, simulta-
neously, allow us to cope with ever rising budgetary challenges.
Here we formulate nine recommendations for policy makers in
Belgium and in other countries that make use of payer-provider
reimbursement councils by linking them to the cases in our study.
1. Separate a standard decision procedure from a ‘fast track’
procedure to allow rapid reimbursement of new care
interventions with an exceptional value for public health (such
as trastuzumab). Use fast track by exception only, based on a
fixed set of formalized criteria and with full public transpar-
ency. Give no stakeholder group the freedom to decide
singularly to deviate from one of both procedures (e.g. hadron
therapy).
2. As a first ‘evidence’ stage of both procedures, summarize all
available evidence by a full or rapid health technology
assessment, providing policy makers with a balanced overview
of inconsistencies and remaining gaps in the evidence, with all
pro’s and con’s of a positive versus negative decision (all cases).
Speed up, but do not discard, this stage as part of the fast track
procedure (aorta endoprosthesis, oseltamivir, trastuzumab).
Document cost to the health care system (all cases) and cost to
the patient (aorta endoprosthesis, trastuzumab) objectively,
with cost-effectiveness analysis.
3. During the ‘evidence’ stage, invite an external panel of key
experts in the care intervention subject under review to reach
consensus. Select members of the panel independently, for
example based on the number and quality of contributions to
knowledge as authors of peer reviewed papers on the topic, and
make their conflicts of interest public. A representation of the
scientific community by one or two persons is insufficient
(oseltamivir). Because experts often are local care providers
(aorta endoprosthesis, hadron therapy), compose the panel with
an equally large proportion of experts who will not benefit from
any decision outcome. As our cases show, often a professional
group as a whole has a financial conflict of interest. Involving
international experts, with selection based on publications,
could offer a partial solution to address this problem.
4. Evidence should not only address the yes or no decision to
reimburse or not. It should also address how to implement a
positive reimbursement decision further in practice, based on
the methods that have shown most optimal results.
5. Make a country or payer comparison part of the ‘evidence’
stage (including ‘implementation’ evidence), with equal atten-
tion to countries or payers who decided to reimburse, as to the
ones that decided otherwise (trastuzumab).
6. In times of a public health crisis, time may be lacking for a
comprehensive ‘evidence’ stage. Still, consult a sufficient
Healthcare Reimbursement Decision Making
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number of local and international scientific experts to inform
policy makers in a balanced way (oseltamivir).
7. Although there is a call to involve stakeholder groups even
more in policy making, we think that the factors ‘experience,
expertise & judgment’, ‘values, ideology, & political beliefs’ and
‘lobbyists & pressure groups’ should become relevant in the
‘negotiation’ stage only, after the ‘evidence’ stage has been
terminated. Based on all previously summarized information,
stakeholders - each from their own perspective - have the
freedom to discuss, argument and reach agreement.
8. Media attention is not controllable. However, a more
systematic application of the procedures above is likely to
prevent policy makers to move prematurely from the evidence
towards the negotiation stage when feeling pressured by the
media (aorta endoprosthesis, oseltamivir, Alzheimer medica-
tion, trastuzumab). Minimize pressure from suppliers (aorta
endoprosthesis) through normative regulation and make the
financial and non financial compensation to care providers and
patient organizations public.
9. Finally, periodically review reimbursement decisions, taking
into account new evidence that becomes available (Alzheimer
medication). However, base the decision to reevaluate on
formalized criteria. This will prevent that a care intervention
for which reimbursement has been turned down, is reentered
repeatedly into the process to let it pass (hadron therapy).
The findings of our study should be interpreted with caution.
Being qualitative in nature, they cannot be generalized towards all
reimbursement decisions. Future research should examine wheth-
er the evidence based policy framework can find similar
interactions in other cases. Equal attention should be given to
cases in which reimbursement was declined. We interviewed a
number of key decision makers only, and not all stakeholders
involved. We did not attempt to reach further saturation, because
the analysis across cases already revealed a sufficient number of
recurring patterns. Since we used a conceptualized framework to
detect themes, this might have prevented us from identifying other
influential factors. However, all respondents confirmed that our
framework provided a sufficient degree of coverage of how each
case evolved.
Our findings showed that respondents sometimes disagreed with
each other or made statements that were contradictory to what we
know to be evidence from the literature (e.g. was the new
treatment cost-effective or not; and was this issue taken into
account or not). Such inconsistencies are likely due to a mixture of
inconsistencies in the evidence itself, selective information use from
a personal stakeholder perspective, the possibility that one was not
aware of certain facts at the time of decision making and/or recall
bias several years after a decision was made.
Finally, we studied reimbursement policy in Belgium only. As
reported above, our findings correspond well with general theories
and findings in other health systems. There is no reason to assume
that components of the framework as a whole will impact
reimbursement decision making differently in other developed
countries. Many health systems make use of a similar centralized
procedure as the one central to the study. Other countries, such as
the United States of America, decentralize the decision making to
individual insurance agencies. The same factors are likely to be at
play, although the degree of negotiation power will be different in
such a context. Some findings, such as the impact of cost to
patient, the impact of cultural differences and the impact of
decision making jurisdictions within a health system are also likely
context dependent.
Conclusions
Reimbursement decisions for new drugs, implants and other
health care interventions in Belgium are the outcome of a process
of interplay between several factors. Clinical and health economic
evidence played a role in many of the decisions, but was often not
the predominant factor in the decision made. Based on the analysis
of six cases, we formulated nine recommendations, aimed at policy
makers in Belgium and other countries making use of payer-
provider reimbursement councils, that are expected to reconcile
the ‘evidence’ and the ‘negotiation’ stage of health policy decision
making in a more systematic and balanced way, without hurting
the fundamentals of democratic debate. This may be one of many
instruments to cope with the increasing budgetary pressure in
health care, by separating real, worthwhile innovations from
additional ‘waste’. Future research should focus on the relative
importance of influential factors on decision making. A mixed
methods approach, adding quantitative to qualitative information,
is recommended.
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